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Introduction 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s controversial ruling in the eminent domain case of Kelo v. 
City of New London, Connecticut,1 ignited nationwide discourses on eminent domain. In a close 
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the government authority to condemn private 
property and transfer it to other private parties to promote “economic development.”2 The 
court’s affirmative decision in allowing the City to strip the petitioner, Susette Kelo, of her 
home of decades for the development of a Pfizer plant stirred overwhelming widespread 
outrage and prompted federal and state legislative reactions.3 The startling yet sobering public 
outcry revealed the nub of the problem, as Professor Thomas W. Merrill testified to the Senate 
that “the American people believe that property rights are invested with moral significance.”4 
 
The right to private property is a central part of the American constitutional tradition. 
However, when people’s constitutional property rights conflict with government authorities’ 
and interests, the Court is restrained, if not reluctant, to enforce them.5 Kelo v. City of New 
London illustrates one dimension of such a legal controversy, whether “economic 
development” is a valid public use that satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment 
Taking Clause. While the Court in Kelo affirms such claim, I disagree with its position -- private 
economic development cannot be the sole objective of eminent domain.  
 
This paper explores the evolution of the economic development rationale in the context of 
eminent domain power, its rationale and problems, and potential solutions. Part II explores the 
origin and evolution of the Public Use clause in the Constitution and then focuses on two major 
Supreme Court decisions that paved the road for the contemporary economic development 
rationale for eminent domain. Part III examines the establishment of economic development 
                                                
1Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
2 Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 2-3. 
3 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 711 
4 The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005)  
5 Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 2. 
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rationale, from the state court precedent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. Then it 
distinguishes Kelo from Supreme Court precedents and discusses the legislative backlash to 
highlight Kelo’s misuse of eminent domain power. Part IV explicates the inherent problems of 
using economic development to justify the private-to-private eminent domain. Finally, Part V 
draws on examples from other jurisdictions combating the issue of expropriation to shed light 
upon alternative solutions to the abuse of eminent domain power in the name of economic 
development.  
 
The “Public Use” Limits on Eminent Domain 
 
As one of the most intrusive inherent government powers,6 eminent domain is the 
government's authority to take a citizen’s private property for public use without the owner’s 
consent. Realizing that the right to property ownership is indispensable in securing individual’s 
liberty and freedom, the framers of the Constitution placed two fundamental yet loosely 
defined restraints on the government’s exercise of eminent domain, that the government may 
only take private property for public use, and must provide just compensation to the owner of 
the said property.7 Of the two restraints, the public use requirement has arguably posed a more 
significant challenge to the judicial system, because its elusive concept has dramatically 
changed since conception.  
 
Historically, the concept of public use was construed narrowly, requiring that the taken land be 
for the use of only the general public, such as highways, bridges, and other public utilities.8 
Many courts saw laws or acts which “took from A to give to B,” as shown in Kelo, as the 
paradigmatic abuse of government power.9 However, beginning in the Progressive Era, 
intellectual leaders started to reevaluate the role of government, taking more initiatives to 
promote public welfare.10 The landmark case Nebbia v. New York reflects such an evolving 
attitude, upholding that states are free to adopt whatever policy that they deem reasonable for 
social welfare, establishing the “rational basis test.”11 Twenty years after Nebbia, as the Court 
imposed the rational basis test on eminent domain issues in Berman v. Parker,12 the clear 
boundaries of public use began to erode, and courts gradually understand it more broadly, 
encompassing not only “for public use” but also “public purpose.” Two cases in the Supreme 
                                                
6 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 712 
7 U.S. Constitution. Amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation."). 
8 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 176.  
9 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 712 
10 Id. at p. 716 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
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Court reflect the evolution of the public use constraint and paved the way for economic 
development eminent domain: Berman v. Parker,13 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.14 
 
From “Public Use” to “Public Benefit”  
 
The 1930s brought an upsurge in urban projects, designed to eliminate slums and blight, aided 
by legislative funding aid, such as the United States Housing Act of 1937.15 While some courts 
initially struck down government’s attempts to use eminent domain power to carry out urban 
renewal programs, the majority upheld such taking by adopting the “public purpose” approach 
to the public use rule.  
 
Berman v. Parker 
 
This frenzy of slum clearing set the stage for a new era of public use jurisprudence in the 
Supreme Court with its landmark decision in Berman v. Parker, in 1954. In this case, the 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the District of Columbia’s authority to condemn private 
property and transfer it to other private parties for the purpose of removing plight and slums 
and revitalize inner-city neighborhoods.16 Adapting the rational basis test to the public use 
context, Justice Douglas holds the deference that “the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main 
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.”17 In Berman, the Congress had 
determined public needs that a large area of the city has fallen into the slum state, posing a 
pressing danger to the public health and safety.18 To remedy the problem, the Congress enacted 
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Act of 1945. It authorized the city’s redevelopment 
agency to take the blighted properties and transfer them to a private developer, who would 
then revitalize this area by constructing and managing new commercial and residential 
complexes.19 The owner of a department store in that land sued, arguing that the property was 
transferred by the government to a private party.20 Nonetheless, the Court deemed the 
government approach to be reasonable in furtherance of a proper legislative purpose of 
removing plight and rebuilding the city’s economy, thus constitutional.21  
 
However, before asserting the rationality of the government action, the Court must establish 
that the transfer of private property to another private party with a public purpose is within the 
                                                
13 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
14 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
15 Cohen, Charles E.”Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning 
Economic Development Takings.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 510  
16 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 33-35 (1954). 
17 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 716 
18 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 28 (1954). 
19 Id. at 29-30.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 33-35. 
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boundary of “public use.” While Congress declared that redevelopment of slums and blighted 
areas has public benefit,22 the word “use,” after all, is not synonymous with “purpose.” The 
Court then broadened the term “use.” Referring to several nineteenth-century cases  involving 
railroads, where some courts allowed the government to take private properties and transfer 
them to private railroads corporations because railroads were essentially public utilities, the 
Berman Court thus upheld that “public use” and “public purpose” are equal.23 However, while 
the previous courts limited eminent domain by requiring the government to manage the 
railroads, instead of the private corporations, the Berman Court disregarded such requirements 
and further showed deference to the legislative by leaving the determination of what acts 
benefit the public to the legislature’s discretion.24  
 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 
 
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court reinforced its decision in Berman by unanimously 
upholding takings of property for public benefit against the argument that they are private 
takings. The setting for Midkiff was Hawaii, when, in the mid-1960s 94% of the privately owned 
land was owned by seventy-two citizens, while the governments owned 49%.25 The Court 
endorsed the legislative’s claim that the unequal distribution of property is harmful to the local 
land market, inflating land prices and injuring the social welfare and stability.26 The Hawaii 
legislature responded to the skewed land market by passing the Land Reform Act of 1967, under 
which the government agency could condemn the properties of large landowners and transfer 
to existing lessees.27 Employing the rational basis test, the Court found that the government’s 
eminent domain condemnation is rationally related to the state’s conceivable public purpose to 
diminish land oligopoly, thus constitutional under Berman precedent.28  
 
 
Establishment of Private Economic Development Rationale: The 
Birth of Economic Development Doctrine in the States 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit 
 
In the interim between Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme Court of Michigan issued one of the 
most notorious public use decisions. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,29 the 
                                                
22 Id. at, 34 
23 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 718 
24 Id.  
25 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 233. 
28 Id. at 241-242.  
29 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) 
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rationale of government exercising its eminent domain for economic development took root. 
Suffering from financial distress and high unemployment, the City of Detroit tried to displace 
3438 residents and 1176 structures in the Poletown neighborhood, condemning the land to 
make room for General Motors’ (GM) new manufacturing factories.30 Deferring to the 
government’s view that GM plant’s expected economic revitalization would generate public 
benefit during an economic recession, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld that a public use 
existed under the Michigan Constitution.31 However, because, in this case, eminent domain 
exercised by the government will benefit specific and identifiable private interests, the court 
purported to inspect with heightened scrutiny whether the public benefit is the predominant 
interest over the “incidental” private gain.32 The court answered in affirmative that the 
projected benefit was “clear and significant.”33 Hence, the doctrine of economic development 
emerged: the government can legitimately take non-blighted properties if other economic 
stimuli were at stake.34 
 
The Aftermath and Reversal of Poletown  
 
The Poletown decision sparked a new latitude of exploiting “public use” for economic 
development. In the 1980s, with Poletown decision specifically in mind, local condemnations 
with the  asserted purpose of economic growth began to increase.35 Consequently, litigations 
challenges to such eminent domain increased in tandem, where property owners charged that 
even under the expanded definition of public use, some particular projects could not pass.36 
 
In one of the earlier property-owner successes, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 372004, the 
Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletown, one of the most notorious cases in laws on 
eminent domain.38 The case involved the condemnation of several homeowners’ property for 
the construction of a 1,300-acre business and technology park.39 Despite the economic prospect 
and relatively smaller costs for individual private property owners, compared to Poletown, the 
court declared Poletown’s interpretation of the state taking clause to be unconstitutional.40 
Recognizing that the county was motivated by the Poletown’s disregard for constitutional limits 
of its eminent domain power, the court established that the vague public benefit that would 
                                                
30 Id. at 465-470 
31 Id. at 457-459.  
32 Id. at 459.  
33 Id.  
34 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 190 
35 Meltz, Robert, American Law Division. Condemnation of Private Property for Economic Development: 
Kelo v. City of New London. Congressional Research Service. 2005. p. 3 
36 Id.  
37 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
38 Id. at 769. 
39 Id. at 770. 
40 Id. at 786-787 
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result from the economic development project could not satisfy the constitutional public use 
requirement.41 All set the stage for Kelo.  
 
The Supreme Court’s Approval of Economic Development 
Kelo v. City of New London 
 
Having lessened the constraint of Public Use limits on eminent domain power, the Supreme 
Court, as predicted, further affirmed the state’s authority to condemn private property and 
transfer it to private developers to revitalize the local economy in Kelo v. City of New London.42  
Desperate for economic revival, the City of New London was Susette Kelo’s hometown, where 
she purchased a pink Victorian dream house in the Fort Trumbell neighborhood ten years 
before and had lived there ever since. To combat the city’s economically distressed status, the 
local officials launched a series of attempts, including the creation of The New London 
Development Corporation (NLDC), to oversee the revitalization project.43  
 
In 1998, the city received the good news that Pfizer, an international pharmaceutical giant, 
planned to construct a $300 million research facility on a New London site adjacent to Fort 
Trumbell.44 Hoping the new plant would anchor the local economic redevelopment plan and 
capitalize Pfizer’s potential new business, the city approved NLDC’s municipal development 
plan (MDP) for the Fort Trumbell neighborhood and granted NLDC the power to acquire 
property within the development area through eminent domain.45 Although the specifics of the 
plan were never articulated, as the NLDC never precisely defined the respective purposes of 
MDP’s seven parcels, city officials still argued that the redevelopment project would benefit the 
public, thus constitutional.46 Faced with the opposition from Susette Kelo, along with several 
other residents refusing to give up their homes, the NLDC initiated condemnation procedures 
merely because their properties, in no blighted condition, resided within the development 
area.47 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the development plan in a close 5-4 
decision. The majority adhered to the principle regarding public use established in case laws 
that public benefit falls within the interpretation of public use and took a deferential stance to 
the legislature’s determination that MDP’s plan served sufficient public purpose of economic 
rejuvenation.48 Asserting that the promotion of economic development is a traditional and long 
accepted function of government, the majority rejected setting a bright-line rule that economic 
                                                
41 Id.  
42 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
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development does not constitute a valid public use.49 However, the majority did find two 
conditions that would violate the public use requirement, that either the taking is to benefit 
private interests, or under the pretext of public purpose, such as economic growth, but 
conferring private interests.50 
 
In dissent, Justice O’Connor took a drastically different stance than her earlier authorship of 
the Court’s opinion in Midkiff, arguably the most deferential of all the Court’s public use 
decisions.51 Acknowledging the history of the Court’s deferential attitude towards legislative 
determination as to what government actions benefit the public, Justice O’Connor insisted that 
some external judicial check is necessary for such decisions.52 Distinguishing from Berman or 
Midkiff, Just O’Connor reasoned that, in Kelo, the condemnation itself did not directly benefit 
the public, but incidental to the private taking.53 Furthermore, not only did Justice O’Connor, 
along with other dissenting judges, strive to invalidate New London takings but would have 
categorically forbidden all private-to-private condemnations for economic development.54 The 
problem with economic development condemnations, she argued, is that private benefits and 
public interests are mutually reinforcing.55 Therefore, it is extremely challenging to isolate an 
intent to benefit the public from one that advances private interests,56 thus foreclosing the 
possibility of any meaningful limits on the scope of eminent domain power. 
 
Differences from Berman and Midkiff 
 
In light of the Court’s prior holdings in Berman and Midkiff, both the majority and dissenting 
opinions referenced to these landmark cases for interpreting the Public Use Clause in Kelo. The 
Court’s majority gutted the constitutional significance of public use constraint, arguing that 
there was no principled difference between economic development and other public purposes 
that the Court had recognized before, such as slums and blight elimination in Berman and 
elimination of land oligopoly in Midkiff.57 Consequently, there was no reason to treat Kelo 
differently from the previous unanimously ruled cases.58 That conclusion, however, was 
arbitrary and misguided. As the dissent explicated, the majority effectively “delete[d] the words 
‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”59 The private economic 
                                                
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 
127 
52 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, at 2673 
53 Id. at 2675.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 2665-2666.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 2671.  
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domain is distinguishable from how the Court had defined and interpreted public use in the 
past, even under the broad terms in Berman and Midkiff. 
 
The first distinction between economic development eminent domain and others with public 
purpose is whether the source from which the public benefit flows is the condemnation itself. 
Traditionally, private property taken by the government is put into public use or government 
ownership, directly generating an immediate public benefit.60 Even in Berman and Midkiff, when 
the Court broadened term public use to permit private-to-private ownership transfer, the 
condemnation itself directly resulted in public benefits.61 In her dissenting opinion, Justice 
O’Connor framed such a distinction with the term “affirmative harm.”62 In Berman, the slums 
and blighted properties in Washington, D.C., had already inflicted affirmative harm on 
society.63 The condemnation itself, regardless of further actions by government or private 
parties, immediately rid the public safety hazard and promote public welfare.64 Similarly, the 
oligopoly of land ownership had skewed the land market and inflated prices in Midkiff, resulting 
in an extreme wealth gap and affirmative harm.65 Therefore, the very act of transferring the 
condemned property from wealthy landowners to the lessees terminated the harmful pre-
condemnation property use.66 Condemnations for economic development, however, do not 
themselves benefit the public, which will accrue only after the private party has put the 
property into use and capitalize on its business.67 In Kelo, Justice O’Connor observed that the 
City of New London did not categorize Kelo’s home as the source of any social harm.68 Hence, 
the taking will not achieve any public purpose but serve as a stepping stone to the realization of 
anticipated public benefit, during which the private party is the primary beneficiary.69 
 
The second distinction concerns the “trickle-down” benefits of condemnations for economic 
development. While the Court had established in previous cases that a government’s pursuit of 
public interests might benefit private parties, such as, in Midkiff, the lessees gained secure 
property ownership in the city’s effort to eliminate land oligopoly, the realization of public 
                                                
60 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 204 
61 Id.  
62 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, at 2674. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 206 
68 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, at 2675. 
69 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 207 
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benefit was dependent on government action instead of the subsequent private use.70 On the 
contrary, in economic development eminent domain, the private party determines if and when 
the public benefit will accrue.71 Justice O’Connor voiced her concern in Kelo dissent, describing 
the public benefit accruing from private gains as a secondary, incidental, and mere positive 
side-effect of the private profit,72 at the expense of individuals’ constitutional right to private 
property.  
 
The third distinction stems from the diminishing effects of the taking itself on the realization 
of public use, meaning that there is no guarantee that anticipated economic development and 
corresponding public benefits will ever materialize.73 Neglecting the volatile nature of 
economic development, the Kelo appeal court focused only on its purposed purpose.74 In reality, 
however, the prospect, let alone the actual achievement, could drastically deviate from the 
proffered purpose, as the development projects often involve unpredictable financial markets 
and uncertain competitive factors.75 The reversal of the Poletown attests to such uncertainty - 
although GM projected its plant would provide over 6000 jobs, the plant, at the height of its 
operation, only employed fewer than 3000 employees.76 Furthermore, when the city permits a 
development project without any definitive plans of the condemned land, the uncertainty 
increases. In Kelo, the development plan firstly never specified the use of parcel 4A, in which 
several petitioners lived, besides a vague definition of “park support.”77 Secondly, at the time of 
condemnation, the NLDC had not signed an agreement with the developer officially.78 Without 
a specific plan or signed agreement to guarantee, or predict the least, potential public benefit, 
the economic development rationale for eminent domain can hardly satisfy the public use 
requirement in the Fifth Amendment.  
 
The Kelo Backlash 
 
While most Supreme Court decisions get little public attention, Kelo stood out as the exception, 
generating more public attention than all but a handful of other Supreme Court rulings.79 The 
negative, if not hostile, public reactions resulted in significant gains for property rights 
                                                
70 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). 
71 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 208 
72 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, at 2675.  
73 Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no. 
1, 2005, p. 209 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 
135 
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advocates and led to more new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision ever 
did.80 Forty-five states have enacted reforms laws in response to the Kelo decision expanding 
the eminent domain power, seeking to change the preexisting status quo.81 While the political 
backlash failed to provide the same level of protection for property owners as a judicial ban 
would, it is crucial to recognize that many states have enacted strong post-Kelo reform laws, 
which substantially strengthened protection for property rights than had existed before Kelo.82 
 
The Public Reaction 
 
The public reaction to Kelo decision was fierce and swift, with both state-level and national 
polls indicating overwhelming public opposition.83 Such condemnation cut across gender, 
racial, ethnic, and partisan lines. The U.S. House of Representatives immediately passed a 
Condemnation and resolution denouncing Kelo.84 Many political elites and activists joined 
forces, some of which testified against the Court’s decision in the United States Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing on the ruling.85 Public opinion, shown in two national surveys, 
reflected the opposition running deep and broad.86 The near-consensus leads one to anticipate 
that the state and federal legislation would soon follow suit to abolish, or at least limit, 
economic development eminent domain.87 
 
The State Response  
 
Acknowledging that condemnations may entail great hardship, Justice Stevens, in his majority 
opinion in Kelo, emphasized that states were free to impose more significant limitations on 
eminent domain power.88 A total of forty-five states welcomed the invitation and enacted post-
Kelo eminent domain reform laws.89 Despite the numbers, many of them are mostly symbolic 
and ineffective, providing little or no protection for private property owners.90 On the other 
hand, laws enacted by some states legislature did impose significant limits on eminent 
                                                
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 726 
84 Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 
135 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 136.  
87 Id. at 141.  
88 Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform." 
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 726 
89 Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 
141 
90 Id.  
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domain.91 For example, both Pennsylvania and Minnesota passed laws forbidding economic 
development eminent domain and restricting the definition of blight.92 Notably, fourteen states 
stood out by enacting reforms by popular referendum.93 As citizen-initiated referendum 
initiatives have led to stronger laws protecting property rights, nine of those provide property 
owners significant protection against economic-development eminent domain beyond the 
existing laws.94 Analyzing the mixed results of state reforms, Timothy Sandefur observes the 
two obstacles faced by property rights advocates: the political influence of powerful developers 
and redevelopment proponents, and the lack of philosophical foundation and support in 
opposition to Kelo decisions.  
 
The Federal Response  
 
Compared with the far more extensive state-level reforms, the federal efforts are notable for 
their modest effects and minimalistic nature.95 On November 3, 2005, the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005 (PRPA) by an 
overwhelming margin of 376 to 38.96 As the most significant federal reform effort, PRPA failed 
to pass the Senate, despite repeatedly getting through the House in 2012, 2014,97 and 2018.98 
When the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected its passage in 2018, the committee argued that 
PRPA’s heavy-handed approach to preventing economic development eminent domain 
punishes faultless communities, while failing to protect individual property owners 
adequately.99 Furthermore, in light of over 40 states’ active legislative responses to Kelo, the 
committee purported that the Congress should not substitute its judgment for that of the 
individual state, therefore opposing PRPA.100 
 
The Problems of Economic Development Rationale  
 
Blurring the boundaries between public use and private benefits, eminent domain for economic 
development raises concerns about the abuse of government power to advance private interests 
at the expense of individual rights and the public good. In addition to the potential misuse of 
                                                
91 Id. at 155 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 160.  
96 Id. at 161.  
97 Id.  
98 Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2017  Report Together with Dissenting Views (to Accompany 
H.r. 1689) (including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office). 2018 
99 Id. at 22. 
100 Id. at 23. 
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local government's police power, the economic development rationale is riddled with other 
problems that would compromise the institution of private property ownership.101 
 
The first inherent problem stems from the fact that the concept of public use has so broadened 
that it could not stand as a barrier against the capture of eminent domain power by private 
interest groups.102 The “interest group capture” describes the phenomenon that individuals will 
use the public policy process to gain benefits from the government at a lower cost than they 
would receive under fair market competition.103 When the municipalities invoke eminent 
domain power, land acquisition is usually less costly and more efficiently.104 Then the interest 
groups will have little incentive to negotiate with the property owners as they would in fair 
market situation.105 The economic development eminent domain, therefore, would have 
damaging effects on the small private property owners in their negotiation with influential 
developers.  
 
The interest group capture phenomenon gives rise to the second problem that state and local 
governments may have incentives to sell their eminent domain power to the extent that the 
private interests trump public benefits as the primary objective.106 Especially when desperate 
for an economic boost, the municipalities may utilize eminent domain power as a “recruiting 
tool” or competitive advantage to attract large developers or tax- and job-generating 
corporations by promising them site condemnation for their projects.107 The Poletown case 
attests to the government’s willingness to abuse its condemnation power to meet the 
developer’s demands.108 After GM offered to build a new facility in the city as long as they could 
find a suitable site, the municipality allowed GM to conceive the project, select pick the site, 
and even make other demands for tax reductions and infrastructure upgrades.109 Finally, the 
city turned over the site to GM for $8 million, while the projected public cost was $200 
million.110 
 
One of the most troublesome aspects of eminent domain power is that the government 
deprives on an asymmetrical basis, leaving a particular property owner to bear the large 
personal cost for the sake of the community benefit.111 When economic development is the 
driving force, and the accrued social benefit become indirect and uncertain, such asymmetry is 
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further amplified, unfairly burdening the low-income residents and low-tax business while 
serving the development firms and large corporations.112 Such practice is inconsistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution and the institution of private ownership, which aims to 
secure to every man whatever is his own.113 
 
Under the theory of Kelo, as Justice O’Connor warned, nearly all property is at the risk of 
condemnation.114 The permissibility of the economic development rationale diminishes the 
security of private ownership. Furthermore, as the government retains the authority to 
determine whether a different use will create more substantial public use than its current one, 
no property, however valuable to its owner, is immune from the government's takings for a 
higher purpose.115 
 
Proposed Solutions to Eminent Domain Abuse Under Economic 
Development 
 
While many commentators have proposed that a categorical prohibition on the economic 
development rationale for eminent domain is the best solution to prevent its abuse, an 
arbitrary ban would also prevent many transactions in public interests and force developers to 
seek other loopholes.116 As the dilemma between private property rights and economic 
development is not exclusive to the US context, comparative analysis across different countries 
may shed light on some potential solutions available to American society after Kelo. 
 
Germany: Public Purpose and Proportionality Tests 
 
Similar to the United States, in Germany, property rights and the government’s right to 
expropriate are based in Article 14 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), and such expropriation, 
stated in Section 3, shall only be permissible for the public good.117 What distinguishes 
Germany from U.S. constitutional property scheme is that property, in Grundgesetz, entails 
obligations, and, therefore, its use shall serve the public purpose.118 However, recognizing 
various property interests as constitutionally protected rights, the Federal Constitution Court 
in Germany takes complete discretion over the definition of property from the legislature.119 
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The Basic Law states that taking must meet two broad public interest criteria: the principles of 
public purpose and proportionality.120 Firstly, only serious public purposes are valid, and, if the 
state transfers the expropriated property to a private party, the state must show that the 
private party is committed to the public purpose, either by contracting or taking collaterals.121 
Unlike the US, however, takings for purely financial reasons, such as increasing tax revenue, are 
not constitutionally permitted in Germany.122 Furthermore, as the Basic Law requires every 
expropriation to fall under a federal or state statute that authorizes takings for that purpose, no 
state law has ever allowed expropriation for job creation, thus preventing the state government 
from abusing its power.123 
 
Secondly, the expropriation must adhere to the German Basic Law legal principle of 
proportionality.124 An uncodified legal construct, the principle of proportionality, in the context 
of eminent domain, requires that taking is the mildest possible, yet necessary, infringement on 
a right, and that the government can only take as much property as the project needs.125 
Furthermore, the proportionality test requires that the net public benefit generated in the 
expropriation outweighs the owner’s private interest in the property.126 
 
Japan: Land Readjustment as Alternative to Expropriation  
 
As eminent domain brings constant tensions between private property rights and public 
purpose, one tool could be particularly useful in the US context: land readjustment.127 It 
consists of pooling all land parcels within a designated area, joint planning for servicing the 
land, and redistributing the land parcels orderly for public improvements.128 Widely used in 
many countries, land readjustment mainly addresses three challenges: a disorderly plot 
pattern, insufficient public space, and lack of funding or ability to expropriate private land for 
public use.129 Additionally, through the creation and sale of extra land parcels, land 
readjustment can raise funds, thus allowing neighborhood upgrade to be self-financing.130 
 
Arguably the leading example of land readjustment scheme in Asia, Japan has one of the most 
participatory land readjustment processes in the world, used in over 50% of all new 
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development areas.131 Projects in Japan have a wide range of executors, from individuals, 
landowner associations, and housing and town corporations, to local governments and 
government agencies.132 As land readjustment project usually requires a minimum number of 
participating landowners’ approval, in Japan, the two-thirds of owners and leaseholders must 
agree on the plan if initiated by the private sector.133 
 
To develop a successful land readjustment, the government ought to establish the following 
primary conditions. Firstly, the legislature must construct a legal framework and articulate at 
the state level, specifying what options exist if the landowner resists providing the land parcel, 
as well as the entities, purposes, and timeframes permissible to initiate land readjustment 
projects.134 Secondly, the sharing of costs and benefits between the public body and landowners 
should be transparent and specified throughout the development timeline, from initial pooling 
to final redistribution.135 While the municipality and the landowners do not have to share costs 
and benefits equally, the distribution should reflect their respective contributions.136 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the decision of Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court had stretched the concept of 
public use far beyond its constitutionality, to encompass the economic development rationale. 
Though the Court’s decisions in Berman and Midkiff expanded the scope of public  use and 
paved the way for Kelo, eminent domain for the purpose of economic development is distinctly 
separate from these two precedents, regarding the sources of public benefit, its dependence on 
private profits, and its uncertainty of economic prospect. All the differences point to the fact 
that eminent domain, under the disguise of economic development, prominently benefits the 
private parties, thus rendering the Public Use doctrine in the Constitution nugatory. The 
striking public reaction against the Kelo decision further highlights the legislative resistance 
against the misuse of eminent domain power. Besides its unconstitutionality, the economic 
development rationale has various problems that also compromise the institution of private 
ownership in American society. As the inherent conflict of interests between the private 
property rights and the government’s eminent domain authority is not exclusive to the US 
context, comparative analysis across various nations may provide valuable lessons. Germany 
has approached the problem by allowing more judicial scrutiny in the process of expropriation 
and imposing strict limitations on the beneficiaries. Japan, along with various countries in the 
world, has adopted the land readjustment to avoid the complications in expropriation while 
achieving needed public use for private land. The states in the United States would do well to 
learn from the numerous strategies to protect private ownership while advancing urban 
development.  
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